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Associational Structures of Religious
Organizations
Patty Gerstenblith*
A legal structure is the organizational framework within
which the law permits business to be conducted. Over the past
four centuries, religious organizations have used various
structures to gain legal recognition, status, and rights,
particularly the right to acquire and to hold property. During
the colonial era, the colonists borrowed extensively from
English law in all areas, including the treatment of religious
societies. Guided by the prevailing English method of the time,
most of the colonies (and subsequently the states) provided
legal status and certain rights to religious organizations, as to
business corporations, by the granting of special charters.
The purpose of a special charter was to create a
corporation for a particular purpose and to assure certain
rights or powers. A special charter required an act of the
sovereign or legislature. Just as the Crown and the Parliament
in England held the power to approve or deny the creation of a
corporation, the states similarly continued to maintain the
special charter system to which both ecclesiastical and lay
corporations were subject. However, abuses inherent in the
special charter system, including favoritism and obstruction of
the work of legislatures because of the numerous demands for
such charters, became apparent during the nineteenth century,
and states therefore gradually replaced the special charter
system with general incorporation statutes. These general
incorporation statutes included within their scope a variety of
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. A.B. 1971, Bryn
Mawr College; Ph.D. 1977, Harvard University; J.D. 1983, Northwestern University.
I wish to thank Craig Mousin, Director, and John Massad, Research Associate, of
the DePaul University Center for ChurchIState Studies, and Professor Cole Durham
for their insightful discussions of the larger project, of which this article is a part.
I also want to acknowledge the research assistance of David Navetta and Jo
Wilson.
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charitable and not-for-profit corporations, including religious
organizations.'
Despite the inherent differences in the natures of not-forprofit and business corporations, state statutes for not-for-profit
corporations often mirror the state statutes for general forprofit business corporations. This similarity may lie in the fact
that in the development of American statutory law, business
corporations received more attention from legislatures,
progressed more rapidly, and were of greater concern to the
legal and business communities t h a n not-for-profit
corporation^.^ For example, the study and preparation of
model acts for business corporations preceded the drafting of a
model act for not-for-profit corporations, and the drafters of the
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act clearly borrowed heavily
from the previously published model and actual business
corporation statute^.^ A second reason for the apparent
similarity may be that the same attorneys, coming fkom
corporate business backgrounds, tend to draft both types of
statute^.^ This influence may be seen in those states which use
1. Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law,
71 MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1973).
2. Louis P. Haller, The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act, 9 BAYLORL. REV.
309, 316 (1957).
3. The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the
Uniform Business Corporation Act in 1928 after nearly twenty years of study,
while the Model Business Corporation Act was published in its initial form in
1946. Id. a t 315. On the other hand, the original draft of the Model Non-Profit
Corporation Act was not published until 1952 and was subsequently revised in
1957, 1964, and 1987. Id. at 320; Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 528 (1981).
4. Almost all members of the American Bar Association committees that
draR or amend model not-for-profit corporation acts have been corporate business
attorneys, although it is possible that, as the number of not-for-profit organizations
expands, this may change. HOWARDL. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS,
AND ASSOCIATIONS 61 (5th ed. 1988). The approach taken by these
drafters may be skewed by their business backgrounds. Hansmann, supra note 3,
a t 528. Oleck criticizes the validity of such an approach by business lawyers.
Instead, Oleck contends that the drafters should include "philosophers,
anthropologists, biologists, statisticians and demographers, theologians, sociologists,
economists, psychologists, and the like, plus a few lawyers to crystallize the
principles enunciated by the committee into workable rules of law." OLECK,supra,
a t 61.
However, another commentator suggests a possible argument to support the
business-oriented approach. Not-for-profit corporation acts which resemble business
corporation acts will be easier to use and apply by lawyers who are already
familiar with the procedures of the more widely used business corporation acts and
with the case law that has developed construing them. Thus, any knowledge of or
expertise in the business law area would conceivably help a lawyer work with and
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a single act to govern both business and not-for-profit
corporations, even though particular provisions may apply to
only one type of ~orporation.~
State law is the primary source for the formation,
structure, operation, legal rights and duties, non-tax
regulation, and dissolution of organization^.^ Under the
different state statutes,' the current legal structures available
to religious organizations include the charitable trust, the
unincorporated association, the corporation sole, religious
corporations, and not-for-profit corporations. However, not all
of these legal structures are available in every state. According
to the recently completed Survey of Regional and National
Religious Organizations, conducted by the DePaul University
Center for ChurchIState Studies, the surveyed organizations
adopted each of these available structural forms in the
following proportions: 8% use the form of an unincorporated
association; 3% use the general not-for-profit corporation; 87%

understand a similarly constructed not-for-profit corporation law. Haller, supra note
2, at 320.
5. For example, the not-for-profit corporation laws of Delaware, Kansas, and
Oklahoma are embedded in each state's general corporation law. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, $4 101-398 (1991 & Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. $8 17-6001 to -7404
(1988); OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 18, $8 1001-1143 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992).
6. Two "levels* or sources of law-the federal government and the 50 state
governments-regulate business, as well as nonbusiness organizations. As applied
to not-for-profit organizations, including charitable organizations, this is significant
because different aspects of formation, benefits or favorable treatment, and
regulation arise variously from state or federal law. Perhaps the most characteristic
feature of not-for-profit organizations is their tax-exempt status and, in the case of
charitable organizations, the deductibility of donations for federal income tax
purposes of the donor. These benefits arise from federal income tax law and are
mirrored, with some variations, in comparable tax benefits at the state level-for
example, exemption from state corporate income tax, property taxes and state sales
tax. The federal Internal Revenue Service is the primary means of preventing
abuses and restricting certain types of activities in which such organizations may
engageprimarily political activity, such as campaigning and lobbying, and
unrelated business activities. I.R.C. $5 501(c)(3), 170 (1994).
7. An organization which wishes to obtain various legal rights or privileges,
such as federal tax-exempt status, would likely choose to receive a legal status
under state law first. However, in the United States, unlike many other nations, it
is not necessary for legal status to be acquired or for religious organizations to
register in any form before they are able to operate. Many religious organizations
in the United States have the status of an unincorporated association or charitable
trust, for which no registration or incorporation is required. The purpose of the
legal formalities is only to confer certain specific legal benefits on religious
organizations and' to facilitate the achieving of certain other benefits, such as taxexempt status, although incorporation is by no means necessary to achieving taxexempt status.
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use the religious not-for-profit corporation form; and 1% each
use the charitable or religious trust, a corporation sole, a forprofit corporation, or "some other type of legal stru~ture."~
It is
likely that the 87% that indicated use of the religious not-forprofit corporate form encompasses both the specific religious
corporation form and the not-for-profit corporation organized
for religious purposes. These results are not necessarily
indicative of the distribution of structural forms which would
be found at the local level where, although the religious
corporation form might still prevail, some of the other forms,
particularly the unincorporated association, may appear more
frequently.
The primary characteristic (and the one necessary to
receive advantageous tax status) of not-for-profit organizations
is the "nondistribution ~onstraint."~
This means that the
members, officers and directors of the organization do not
receive any profit from the activities of the organization. A
"not-for-profit" organization may, in fact, earn a profit; it
simply cannot distribute that profit to its membership but
must, instead, utilize that "profit" in furthering its not-forprofit purpose.1° Most state statutes grant an exception to this
nondistribution constraint so that "reasonable compensation
[can be paid] to members, directors and officers for services
rendered."ll
In addition to being characterized by the non-distribution
constraint, most not-for-profit organizations may be categorized
as falling into one of two groups-the
"mutual" benefit
organizations and the "public" benefit organizations. The latter

8. Judith A. Schejbal, with Paul Lavrakas and John P.N. Massad, 1994
Report on the Survey of Religious Organizations at the National Level 13, DEPAUL
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGEOF LAW CENTERFOR CHURCHBTATE
STUDIES.
9. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838 (1980).
10. State statutes may define a not-for-profit corporation as "a corporation no
part of the income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors or
officers." VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 11, 5 2302(3) (1993); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
Q 450.2108(2) (West Supp. 1994) (defining a not-for-profit corporation as a
corporation "incorporated to carry out any lawful purpose or purposes not involving
pecuniary profit or gain for its directors, officers, shareholders, or members"). The
nondistribution constraint is embodied in Internal Revenue Code 5 501(c)(3) (1994).
11. Christine Chute, Comment, Personal Liability for Directors of Nonprofit
Corporations in Wyoming, 18 LAM> & WATERL. REV. 273, 276-77 (1983). Other
forms of nonpecuniary benefits, particularly status and prestige, may inure to
officers and directors of not-for-profit organizations and are generally considered
permissible.
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is largely synonymous with the general category of "charitable"
organizations; they receive significantly more advantageous tax
treatment at the federal and generally also state levels and
usually have a religious, educational, or eleemosynary
purpose.12 Charitable organizations also have stricter
regulation of their activities and their .dissolution processes,
and some state laws define the category more narrowly than
does federal tax law.13 The mutual benefit category may
include social clubs and trade associations; they have fewer tax
advantages but also less strict regulation, and some states
permit the distribution of these organizations' assets to their
membership upon dissolution. Because virtually all religious
organizations would fall into the category of public benefit or
charitable not-for-profit organization, this paper will focus
exclusively on this not-for-profit form."
This article will first present an explanation of the various
associational structures made available to religious
organizations under state law, including the unincorporated
association, charitable trust, not-for-profit corporation, religious
corporation, specific denominational corporation, and finally
corporation sole. While some of these structures are available
to a wide variety of associations, some are specifically limited
to religious organizations and some are even further limited to
particular religious denominations. At the conclusion of this
section, the article considers the questions of whether a
particular religious group can choose its structural form when
the state makes more than one form available, and whether a
religious group can organize in a state which offers an
advantageous structural form but then function in a different
state. The second section considers some of the implications for
12. I.R.C. $ 501(c)(3) (1994).
13. See UTAH CODE ANN. 5 16-6-63 (Michie 1991); Utah County v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 267 (Utah 1985) (holding that,
although a property owner is a nonprofit corporation, it is not exempt from
property tax under state constitution requiring property to be used exclusively for
religious or charitable purposes). Revised regulations, which ensured that the
required "element of gift to the community" would be satisfied to qualify as a
c h ~ t a b l epurpose, were upheld. Howell v. County Bd. ex rel. IHC Hosps., Inc.,
881 P.2d 880, 884-85 (Utah 1994).
14. In tax code terminology, most religious organizations would qualify as
§ 501(c)(3) organizations as long as they conform with the other requirements of
$ 501(c)(3). The typologies used by state statutes vary considerably, however. In
one prominent example, California uses a tripartite classification of mutual benefit,
public benefit, and religious organizations, thus treating religious organizations as a
distinct type of not-for-profit organization.
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Free Exercise claims which can be brought by religious
organizations in light of these structural choices and recent
developments in constitutional jurisprudence.
11. STRUCTURAL
FORMSOF RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS
This section will briefly examine the charitable trust and
the unincorporated association and then focus on the three
forms of corporations available to religious organizations: the
not-for-profit corporation, the religious corporation, and the
corporation sole.

A.

Unincorporated Association and Charitable Trust

The least formal of the organizational structures available
to religious groups are the unincorporated association and the
charitable trust. While these structures have the advantage of
simplicity in their formation, they also have several major
disadvantages under the laws of most states. These disadvantages include lack of limits on personal liability for the members and directors; difficulties in the ownership, receipt and
succession of property, particularly real property; complications
in entering into legal transactions such as contracts and the
initiation of lawsuits; and, for trusts, regulation of the trustees
by very strict principles of fiduciary duty.
For these reasons, most organizations which are of any size
or complexity, which own property, or which desire to gain
other advantages from a more formal corporate status choose to
incorporate under one of the applicable state incorporation statutes. Even those organizations which operate a t the regional or
national level and thus across state lines must incorporate in
one state, and the law of that state will generally determine
any questions involving legal status.
In many states, a religious organization would still have a
choice of corporate form. While the most prevalent form available is the not-for-profit corporation with a religious purpose,
other available forms include the religious corporation and the
corporation sole. Each of these forms will be considered.

B. The Not-for-ProfitCorporation with Religious Purpose

1. Statutory scheme of not-for-profitcorporation statutes
All states have enacted laws to provide for the incorporation of not-for-profit organizations; while all of these statutes
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share certain characteristics, other provisions vary from state
to state. The common significant elements include the requirement of a purpose clause, a procedure to incorporate, an enumeration of general powers, a method for merger and consolidation, and a provision for distribution of assets upon dissolution. Some of the characteristics of those elements which are
distinctive to not-for-profit organizations and religious organizations in particular will be briefly considered.15
The purpose clause of a state statute determines the purposes for which an organization may be formed as a not-forprofit corporation. Throughout the states, two types of statutory provisions prevail. The first type of statute specifically restricts the purposes for which not-for-profit corporations may
be formed by enumerating a lengthy list of permissible purposes, which generally includes a religious purpose? The second
type of purpose clause simply states that a not-for-profit corporation may be formed for any lawful purpose or purposes and
does not include a detailed list of permissible purposes." The

15. The procedures for incorporation of religious organizations under the general not-for-profit corporation statutes do not raise any issues particular to religious
organizations. State statutes generally require one or more individuals to act as
incorporators who sign the articles of incorporation, which include basic information
concerning the corporation-particularly, the purpose for which the corporation exists-and file them in the office of the secretary of state. Corporate existence usually becomes effective on the date of filing, after which the board may adopt bylaws (the regulations governing the internal affairs of the corporation), elect officers, and transact any other business.
16. For example, the Illinois statute restricts the permissible purposes for
which a not-for-profit corporation may be organized to one or more of 30 listed
acceptable purposes or similar purposes, including charitable, benevolent, eleemosynary, educational, civic, patriotic, political, religious, social, literary, athletic, scientific, research, agricultural, soil improvement, crops, livestock, trade and professional associations, and certain cooperative and condominium associations. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 805, para. 1051103.05 (1994); see, e.g., People ex rel. Padula v. Hughes,
16 N.E.2d 922 (Ill. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that incorporation under the not-forprofit corporation act permitted only for those associations which organize for one
of the statutorily enumerated purposes). The states of Virginia and West Virginia
form exceptions to this discussion in that they do not permit the incorporation of
religious organizations; they will be considered later in a separate section.
17. The New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act provides an example of a nonrestrictive purpose clause which nonetheless enumerates specific purposes by way
of illustration, as follows:
A corporation may be organized under this act for any lawful purpose
other than for pecuniary profit including, without being limited to, any
one or more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; cemetery; civic; patriotic; political; religious; social; fkaternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agricultural; horticultural;
animal husbandry; volunteer fire company; ambulance, first aid or rescue;
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trend in state statutes seems to be toward adoption of the general purpose clause provisions, particularly as illustrated in the
current Model Nonprofit Corporation Act.
The general powers granted to not-for-profit corporations
are similar to those granted to business corporation^,'^ with a
few restrictions to ensure compliance with the nondistribution
constraint." Some states specifically limit a not-for-profit
corporation's ability to merge or consolidate with for-profit
corporations; generally, domestic not-for-profit corporations
may merge or consolidate with both domestic and foreign corporations with similar purposes.20
When a not-for-profit corporation undergoes either voluntary or involuntary dissolution, its assets must be dealt with
differently than those of a for-profit corporation. In general,
assets must first be used to pay creditors. Second, the not-forprofit corporation must return to donors those contributions
which were received and held upon the condition that they
would be returned upon dissolution of the corporation. Third,
assets must be transferred to another corporation engaged in
substantially similar activities if the assets were received and
held by the corporation subject to limitations permitting their
use only for a particular purpose including charitable, religious,
eleemosynary, benevolent or other similar purposes. Finally, in

professional, commercial, industrial or trade association; and labor union
and cooperative purposes.
N. J. STAT.ANN. 5 15A:2-l(a) West 1984).
The difference among states in permissible purposes is not particularly significant for religious organizations, because religion is generally considered a permissible purpose. However, the difference does represent a philosophical dispute as to
whether not-for-profit organizations must merely conform to the nondistribution
constraint or whether they must be further restricted to particular categories of
purposes considered beneficial to society. This disagreement is epitomized in the
work of Hansmann and Oleck. See, e.g., OLECK, supra note 4, at 57-100;
Hansmann, supra note 3, at 509-37.
18. Such powers typically include the right to perpetual succession, the ability
to own and deal with real and personal property, the right to sue and be sued,
the right to borrow and lend money, the right to enter into contracts, the ability
to indemnify its officers and directors, and the ability to enact bylaws. See, e.g.,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 5 2352 (1993); see also Pilgrim Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Unaltered Augsburgh Confession v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod
Found., 661 S.W. 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that no distinction exists between the powers of a not-for-profit and a for-profit corporation).
19. The most typical distinctions concern the restrictions on the ability to
compensate officers and directors, which is generally limited to a "reasonablen
amount, and restrictions on the ability to make loans to officers and directors.
20. See, e.g., N.J.STAT.ANN. gg 15A:lO-1, -2, -7 (West 1984).
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the case of mutual benefit organizations, assets are to be distributed to members or other persons as required by the articles of incorporation or bylaws. Thus, the assets of a dissolving not-for-profit corporation are typically distributed, in order,
to creditors, to contributors who have conditioned their gifts, to
another corporation with similar purposes, and to members or
other persons when not inconsistent with statutory restrictions.
Most gifts to a not-for-profit corporation with a religious purpose would be interpreted as conditioned on use for a similar
purpose, and therefore, upon dissolution of such a corporation,
the assets would be given to a corporation with a similar purpose.

2. Incorporation under the general not-for-profit corporation
statute as a specific type
At least six states and the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1987 (RMNCA)21 employ statutory schemes
whereby an organization is required to incorporate as a specific
type of not-for-profit corporation under the general not-forprofit corporation statute. As previously discussed, most states
use either a restrictive or nonrestrictive purpose clause. In contrast, these states and the RMNCA distinguish the purposes of
a not-for-profit corporation by the use of specific categories. The
purpose of this statutory scheme is to provide a single regulatory framework for all not-for-profit corporations while also permitting differences in the treatment of the various types of
corporations.
The New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (N-PCL)"
establishes a single supporting statute not only for the different
types of not-for-profit corporations which can incorporate under
the general statute, but also for those organizations which can
incorporate under entirely distinct statutes.23 Organizations
21. The New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law of 1970 was the final result
CORP.
of a 17-year revision of the state's corporation statutes. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
LAW $5 101-1515 (McKinney 1970). California's current Nonprofit Corporation Law
took effect in 1980. CAL. COW. CODE$$ 5000-10841 (West 1990). The RMNCA was
adopted in 1987, REVISEDMODELNONPROFITCOW. ACT (1987), and the Tennessee
Nonprofit Corporation Act became law on January 1, 1988. Wyoming, Arkansas,
and Florida have more recently adopted the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act. Much of the following discussion is based on Hansmann, supra note 3, a t 52837, and Harry G. H e m & Jeffery H. Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit Organizations: California, Here We Come!, 66 CORNELLL. REV. 1103 (1981).
22. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORP. LAW $5 101-1515 (McKinney 1970).
23. For example, a religious organization can choose to incorporate as either a
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incorporated under the Type B category of not-for-profit corporations, which is equivalent to the public benefit organizations,
ares subjected to greater judicial supervision than are the mutual benefit organization^.^^
The California Nonprofit Corporation ~ a divides
w ~ not~
for-profit corporations into three separate classifications-public benefit, mutual benefit, and religious corporations-and provides a separate set of provisions to regulate
As with the New York scheme, the pureach ~lassification.~~
pose of these three categories is to allow different degrees of
regulation of the different types of corporations. However, while
the public benefit category is subjected to the most extensive

Type B corporation under the general statute, which category includes charitable,
educational, religious, scientific, literary, cultural, and prevention of cruelty to children and animals organizations, or under the specific Religious Corporations statute, in which case it is subjected to the provisions of the N-PCL as a Type D corporation and the N-PCL is used as a default provision for any elements which are
lacking under the Religious Corporations Act. N.Y. RELIG. COW. LAW 5 2-b
(McKinney Supp. 1990); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
COW. LAW 5 201(c) cmt. (McKinney
Supp. 1994).
24. The classification scheme is designed to allow variation in the degree of
regulation of the different classes of not-for-profit corporations, with the amount of
regulation determined by the purpose for each classification. See Hansmann, supra
note 3, at 531; Henn & Boyd, supra note 21, a t 1116. For example, state attorney
general approval is required for the incorporation of a Type B organization. N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT
COW. LAW 5 404(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994). Type B corporations
are subject to inspection visits by the justices of the Supreme Court or their appointees, and the court may require the corporation to make an inventory and
accounting when a member or creditor of the corporation claims that the corporation or its directors, officers or agents has engaged in some impermissible activity
such as misappropriation of funds or property. Id. 5 114. Judicial approval is also
required for a variety of transactions, including the sale, lease, exchange, or disposal of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets, id. 5 510(a)(3), merger or
consolidation, id. 5 907(a), and a plan for distribution of assets upon dissolution of
the corporation, id. 5 1002(d).
25. CAL. CORP. CODE$4 5000-10841 (West 1990).
26. Id. $5 5110-6910 (public benefit corporations); $5 7110-8910 (mutual benefit corporations); 55 9110-9690 (religious corporations). The California statute takes
a distinctly different approach than that of New York in that the three categories
of not-for-profit corporations are each provided a complete and distinct regulatory
scheme, while the New York statute attempts to integrate the provisions through
default mechanisms, thereby avoiding repetition. The California scheme has been
discussed in William T. Fryer, I11 & David R. Haglund, New California Nonprofit
Corporation Law: A Unique Approach, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1979); H e m &
Boyd, supra note 21, a t 1133-34; Michael C. Hone, California's New Nonprofit Corporation Law-An Introduction and Conceptual Background, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 733,
736-37 (1979). Hansmann has criticized this trend in both the New York and California approaches to create multiple categories of not-for-profit corporations in that
they add ambiguity and reflect "fundamental confusion concerning the proper role
and structure for nonprofit organizations." Hansmann, supra note 3, at 538.

ASSOCIATIONAL STRUCTURES
regulation, the religious corporation category receives the least
regulation. This varying degree of regulation is best illustrated
by the s u p e ~ s o r yrole of the state attorney general and the
disclosure requirements imposed upon the different types of

corporation^.^'
The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1 9 8 7 is
~~
similar to the California scheme in that it divides all not-forprofit corporations into public benefit, mutual benefit, and religious corporations, but it does not provide three separate sets
of provisions for each of these not-for-profit categories. However, it does follow the California pattern in that it establishes a
tripartite regime of regulation with the public benefit corporations receiving the most regulation, the religious corporations
receiving the least, and mutual benefit corporations occupying
an intermediate p~sition.~'
Tennessee, again, follows a similar
pattern but recognizes only two categories: mutual and public
benefit corporations. It thus permits a religious corporation to
organize as either a mutual or public benefit ~orporation,~'
but it still subjects religious corporations to the least amount of
reg~lation.~'

27. For example, while public benefit corporations are subject to examination
at all times by the attorney general, only those assets held subject to a charitable
trust by mutual benefit corporations are subject to such supervision. However, the
attorney general has the most limited role in terms of supervising religious corporations, presumably to avoid raising First Amendment problems. C&. CORP.CODE
$8 7140-42, 8510-11, 9230 West 1991); see also Hone, supra note 26, at 743-44.
Similarly, the disclosure requirements vary in degree according to the type of notfor-profit corporation. Public benefit corporations have the most extensive statutory
requirements for record keeping and reporting; religious corporations have the
least, and the mutual benefit corporations have an intermediate standard and are
treated selectively according to size. CAL. COW. CODE$4 6310-24, 9510, 8310-24.
28. REVISEDMODELNONPROFIT
COW. ACT (1987).
29. Id. $5 1.70, 3.04(c), 6.30(f), 7.03(a)(3), 8.31(b)(2), 8.55(d), 11.02(b), 12.02(g),
14.03. In fact, the RMNCA specifically states that
[ilf religious doctrine governing the affairs of a religious corporation is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act on the same subject, the religious doctrine shall control to the extent required by the Constitution of
the United States or the constitution of this state or both.
Id. 5 1.80.
30. TENN. CODEANN. 5 48-51-201(31) (SUPP. 1994).
31. Sample statutory restrictions placed on public benefit corporations include:
purchase of memberships prohibited, id. 5 48-56-303; notice to the attorney general
of derivative suits, id. 5 48-57-103; attorney general initiation of a court-ordered
meeting, id. 8 48-57-103(a)(1); limitations on mergers, id. $5 48-61-102, -106; notice
to the attorney general for the sale of assets other than in the regular course of
activities, id. 5 48-62-102(g); restrictions on voluntary dissolution, id. 5 48-64-103.
On the other hand, religious corporations are specifically exempted from several
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C. Corporate Structures Designed Only for Religious Organizat ions

Some states permit the incorporation of religious organizations in forms other than the not-for-profit corporation. The
various statutory schemes that pertain only to religious corporations include general religious corporation laws, special statutes for particular denominations, and corporation sole acts.

1. General religious corporation laws
Twelve states have statutes designed only for the incorporation of religious organization^:^ while eight additional
states have distinct incorporation statutes which encompass
particular types of benevolent, educational, and charitable
associations, along with religious organization^.^^ Most of
these statutes follow a pattern similar to the general not-forprofit corporation statutes discussed previously, except- that
several of them do not include complete sets of provisions for
handling all corporate matters. In general, however, these
statutes grant authority and provide procedures for the incor-

statutory requirements, including those dealing with transfers of memberships, id.
1) 48-56-202; termination of memberships, id. 8 48-56-302; notice to the attorney
general of removal of directors by judicial proceeding, id. 1) 48-58-110(d); the general prohibition of loans to or guarantees for directors and officers, id. 8 48-58-303;
and provision for receivership or custodianship in judicial dissolution, id. 1) 48-64303. The Tennessee statute also exempts religious corporations from provisions
which are inconsistent with religious doctrine, but only to the extent required by
the federal and state constitutions. Id. 8 48-67-102(b).
32. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 1) 33-264 (West 1987); Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 27, 1) 101 (1989); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para.
110135 (1994); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 1) 2861 (1981); Maryland, MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS 1) 5-308 (1985); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 67, 1) 22 (West 1988); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWSANN. 1) 450.159 West
1990); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.ANN. 1) 315.01 (West Supp. 1994); New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. A m . 4 16:l-2 (West 1984); New York, N.Y. RZLIG. CORP. LAW 1) 2
(McKinney 1990); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. 8 187.01 (West Supp. 1988); and
Wyoming, WYO. STAT.1) 17-8-103 (1977).
33. Alabama ("Churches, Public Societies and Graveyard Ownersn), ALA. CODE
1) 10-4-20 (1987); Colorado ("Religious, Educational, and Benevolent Societiesn),
COLO. REV. STAT.8 7-50-101 (1990); District of Columbia ("Charitable, Educational,
and Religious Associationsn), D.C. CODEANN. 1) 29-1001 (1981); Kansas ("Religious,
Charitable and Other Organizationsn), KAN. STAT.ANN. 8 17-1701 (1980); Missouri
("Religious and Charitable Associationsn), MO. ANN. STAT. 8 352.010 (Vernon 1966);
Ohio (Tkligious and Benevolent Organizations"), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1) 1715.01
(Anderson 1986); Oklahoma ("Religious, Charitable and Educational Corporationsn),
OKLA.STAT.tit. 18, 1) 543 (1986); and Wyoming ("Charitable, Educational, Religious
and Other Societiesn), W O . STAT. 1) 17-7-101 (1977).
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poration of any church or religious o r g a n i z a t i ~ n they
; ~ delineate the powers granted to such a corporation, including the
rights to acquire, hold, and dispose of real and personal property, to borrow money, to have perpetual succession, to sue and
~~
be sued, and to adopt bylaws for their g o v e r n a n ~ e .The
statutes may be incomplete in that only a few of them specifjr
the ability to merge and consolidate with similar corporat i o n ~ and
, ~ ~even fewer have specific provisions for the dissolution and subsequent distribution of assets of religious corporation~.~~
34. In its Religious Corporations Law, New York distinguishes a religious corporation from an incorporated church. "A 'Religious Corporations Law corporation'
is a corporation created for religious purposes . . . ." On the other hand, an incorporated church "is a religious corporation created to enable its members to meet
for divine worship or other religious observances." N.Y. RELIG. Corn. LAW 8 2
(McKinney 1990). Some states require that the religious organization consist of a
certain number of persons before a corporation may be formed. See, e.g., Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8 33-274 (West 1987) (three members); Delaware, DEL.
CODEANN. tit. 27, 8 101 (1989) (15 individuals required); District of Columbia,
D.C. CODE ANN. 8 29-1001 (1991) (three members); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 67, 8 21 (West 1988) (10 members required); Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 18, 8 562 (1986) (three members). Some states also set a minimum
and/or maximum number of trustees (or members of the governing board) of the
religious corporation. See, e.g., Michigan, MICH. COMP.LAWS ANN. 8 450.159 (West
1990) (Church Trustee Corporations must have a minimum of three and a maximum of nine trustees); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.ANN. 8 315.01(2) (West Supp. 1990)
(maximum of fifteen trustees).
35. The list of specific powers may be brief, see, e.g., Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. 8 315.09 (West Supp. 1994), or lengthy, see, e.g., New Jersey, N.J. STAT.
ANN. 8 16:l-4 (West 1984).
36. Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. 8 315.365 (West Supp. 1994) (merger of
religious corporations); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. $8 352.140-.I70 (Vernon 1991)
(benevolent corporations, including religious corporations, may be merged); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT.ANN. 88 16:l-20 to -21 (West 1984) (consolidation procedure and
effect); New York, N.Y. RELIG.CORP.LAW 8 13 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (consolidation of incorporated churches); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODEANN. $8 1715.08, .21 (Anderson 1992) (consolidation of churches having same form of faith and consolidation
with corporation created by representative body); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN.
8 187.14 (West 1992) (consolidation of church corporations or congregations "of the
same church, sect, denomination or ecclesiastical connection").
37. See, e.g., Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. 8 7-50-114 (1990); Connecticut,
CONN.GEN. STAT.ANN. 98 33-264e, 33-264f (West 1987); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT.
45 352.180-.240 (Vernon 1991); New York, N.Y. RELIG. Corn. LAW 8 18 (McKinney
1990). Two states specifically provide for dissolution of a religious society, one by
the superior body in which the assets will vest if the society dissolves, M M . STAT.
ANN. $8 315.37, .38 (West Supp. 1994), and the other upon petition by the governing body if it is a separately incorporated ecclesiastical body, N.Y. RELIG. CORP.
LAW 8 18. Upon dissolution and after payment of debts, the assets of the religious
corporation may revert to those persons who gave or contributed the assets, D.C.
CODEANN. 5 29-911 (1991), or they may belong to a superior ecclesiastical body or
to another organization with similar purposes, CONN.GEN. STAT.ANN. 8 33-264e,
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2. Denominational statutes

Fifteen38 states include special statutory provisions for
particular religious denominations3' which thus enable particular religious groups that belong to one of these denominations
to match their religious precepts and legal requirements far
more closely than may be possible in the absence of such an accommodation. Several reasons have been advanced to explain
the existence of the special statutes to particular denominations. First, these statutes may be viewed as a continuation of
the special charter system, in which the state authorized legal
status to particular churches through the grant of a special
charter." Second, special incorporation statutes for particular
religious denominations may be an extension of the earlier
established status of particular churches." Third, the current
or they may be distributed according to the constitution of the church, see German
Evangelical Lutheran St. Johannes Church v. Metropolitan New York Synod of the
Lutheran Church in America, 366 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). The distribution plan must often be approved by a court. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT.
8 352.210(3); N.Y. RELIG. CORP.LAW 8 18.
38. One state, Nevada, repealed its statute.
39. Much of the following discussion is based on Kauper & Ellis, supra note
1, at 1533-38. See infia notes 44-48 for the specific denominations included in each
of these states' statutes.
40. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1533.
41. Id. In 1775, nine of the 13 colonies had established churches. Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire had established the Congregational Church;
Georgia (in 1758), Maryland (in 1702), New York's lower counties (in 1693), North
Carolina (in 1711), South Carolina (in 1706), and Virginia (in 1609) had established
OF CHURCH
AND STATE3-4 (1982).
the Anglican Church. R.L. CORD,SEPARATION
Established churches were generally known as territorial parishes, which were
public corporations, and any person who resided within the territorial boundaries of
the designated parish had to be a member of that parish. Carl Zollmann, Classes
of American Religious Corporations, 13 MICH. L. REV. 566, 566-68 (1915). These
religious establishments by the state governments were not prohibited by the federal Constitution until the application of the First Amendment religion clauses to the
state governments through incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause), and Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause). However, established
churches had been gradually eliminated between 1776 and 1833. The Congregational Church was disestablished in Connecticut in 1818, in New Hampshire in 1819,
and in Massachusetts in 1833. North Carolina and New York disestablished the
Anglican Church during the Revolutionary War, but disestablishment in Virginia
did not occur until 1786. Disagreement exists as to when disestablishment occurred
in Georgia, Maryland, and South Carolina, although it probably happened between
1776 and 1789. CORD, supra, at 4.
This explanation is partially supported by the fact that most such statutory
schemes are found in the older states, particularly among the original colonies,
including Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1534. How-

4391

ASSOCIATIONAL STRUCTURES

453

body of statutes regarding particular denominations may represent an unwillingness on the part of legislatures to disrupt any
organizations that had formed under earlier statutes.42Finally, special provisions for particular denominations may be
viewed as necessary because general religious incorporation
statutes may not provide a suitable mechanism for some denominations.43
The states vary considerably in the number of denominations included in their special statutes. Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, and New Hampshire include only one denomination in
their special statutory provisions for particular denominations," while New York provides for more than thirty-five different denominations." However, most states include no more
ever, other historical factors may account for the existence of some particular denominational statutes. For example, the enactment of statutes pertaining to the
various Eastern Orthodox churches seems to have occurred during the middle of
the twentieth century following the spread of Communism in Central and Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.
42. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1533 (noting that "any attempt to impair corporate privilege and powers under earlier statutes might be held invalid as
an impairment of the obligation of contracts").
43. William J. Boyer, Jr., Property Rights of Religious Institutions in Wisconsin, 36 MAW. L. REV. 329 (1953) (explaining that the Wisconsin legislature was
aware that "certain religious bodies could not readily comply with the uniformity
required by the statutes concerning religious corporations without drastically altering their government"); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 187.01 (West 1992).
44. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 110150 (1993) (Eastern Orthodox Church);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §$ 12:481-:483 (West 1994) (Orthodox Church); MINN. STAT.
ANN. $5 315.17-.19 (West Supp. 1994) (Protestant Episcopal Church); N.H. F&v.
STAT. ANN. 8 292:15-:17 (1987) (Orthodox Church).
45. All the following citations refer to N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW (McKinney
1990): art. 3 (Protestant Episcopal Parishes or Churches); art. 3A (Apostolic Episcopal Parishes or Churches); art. 3B (Parishes or Churches of the Holy Orthodox
Church in America); art. 3C (Parishes or Churches of the American Patriarchal
Orthodox Church); art. 4 (Presbyterian Churches); art. 5 (Roman Catholic Churches); art. 5A (Christian Orthodox Catholic Churches of the Eastern Confession); art.
5B (Ruthenian Greek Catholic Churches); art. 5C (Orthodox Churches); art. 6 (Reformed Dutch, Reformed Presbyterian, and Lutheran Churches); art. 7 (Baptist
Churches); art. 8 (Congregational Christian and Independent Churches); art. 8A
(Churches of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of America); art. 8B (Churches of
the Holy Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in Exile); art. 9 (Free Churches); art. 9A (Churches of Christ, Scientist); art. 10 (other denominations, including
$ 195 (Disciples of Christ), 201 (United Brethren in Christ), 202 (United Society of Shakers), § 204 (Evangelical United Brethren), § 204a (Religious Society of
Friends), 206 (Church of Christ (Disciples)), $ 207 (Jewish congregations), 5 210
(Independent Associated Spiritualist), and 8 211 (Spiritualist Science Mother
Church, Inc.); art. 11 (Union Churches); art. 1lA (Free Methodist Churches); art.
13 (Spiritualist Churches); art. 14 (Churches of the Nazarene); art. 15 (Orthodox
Greek Catholic (Eastern Orthodox) Churches); art. 16 (Spiritualist Churches Connected with the National Spiritualist Association); art. 17 (Methodist Churches);

454

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNrVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

than seven particular denomination^.^^ Similarly, the states
differ in the particular denominations included. For example,
only two states include the Universalist Church," and only
three states include Lutheran churches of various kinds.48The
four most common denominations included in the various statutes are, in order, the Protestant Episcopal Church, Methodist
Churches, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Eastern Orthodox Chur~h.~'
3. Corporation sole

a. Introduction.
(1) General definition. The
third and least common form of corporate structure available to
religious organizations is the corporation sole. This corporate
form exists in only twenty-six states and is usually available
only to religious organizations. The corporation sole has been
described as the practical equivalent to the modern one-person
corporations0in which the office is incorporated and the individual holding the office a t a given time has the corporate
pri~ileges.~'
Upon the death of the officeholder, the successor

art. 18 (Churches of the Byelorussian Autocephalic Orthodox Church in America);
art. 19 (Unitarian and Universalist Societies); and art. 20 (Assemblies of God
Churches).
46. See, e.g., Delaware, DEL. CODEANN. tit. 27, $8 114-118 (1989) (two denominations); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. 85 17-1711-13c, 17-1716a-16c, 17-1732-33,
17-1753-55 (1993) (three denominations); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. &
ASS'NS $$ 5-314 to -336 (1993) (four denominations); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN.
LAWSANN. ch. 67, $5 39-61 (West 1988) (four denominations); Maine, ME. REV.
STAT.ANN. tit. 13, $ 2982 (West 1981) (three denominations); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, $8 781-944 (1989) (seven denominations); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT.ANN.
$8 187.01-.19 (West 1992) (six denominations). Michigan, however, includes fifteen
STAT.ANN. g$ 21.1691-.2021 (Callaghan 1993).
denominations. MICH.
47. New York, N.Y. RELIG. COW. LAW $$ 400-414 (McKinney 1990) (Unitarian
and Universalist Societies); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, $8 941-944 (1989)
(Universalist Church).
48. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. $8 33-277 to -278, -278a to -278b
(West 1987) (Augustana Gvangelical Lutheran Church and Lutheran Church in
America, respectively); New Jersey, N.J. STAT.ANN. $9 16:5-1 to -27 (West 1984)
(Evangelical Lutheran Church); New York, N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW $5 110-116
(McKinney 1990) (Reformed Dutch, Reformed Presbyterian, and Lutheran Churches).
49. Kauper & Ellis, s u p m note 1, a t 1535.
50. OLECK,supra note 4, at 20.
51. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1540. Blackstone defined a corporation
sole as "one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are
incorporated by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages,
particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have
COMMENTARIES
*469.
had." 1 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,
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to the office becomes the corporation, thus granting perpetuity
to the individual in his or her capacity as an officeholder. In
the religious context, a corporation sole is the incorporation of
the bishop or other presiding officer of the church for the purposes of administering and managing the affairs, property and
temporalities of the
The principal purpose of a corporation sole is to insure the continuation of ownership of a
religious organization's property. At the death of the individual
holding the office, church property passes to the successor to
the office for the benefit of the religious group, rather than
passing to the officeholder's heirs.53
The corporation sole is a particularly useful organizational
form for hierarchical religions because the organization's legal
structure is able to mirror its internal theological structure. For
example, in a hierarchical church, the bishop often has control
over the church property according to the internal church polity
and structure. By incorporating as a corporation sole, the
bishop will also have legal authority to deal with church property. Because hierarchical churches are easily able to identify
church officials with power and authority, they can easily identify which offices to incorporate as corporations sole.54
(2) Historical background. Under English common law, there were two types of corporations sole: civil and
ecclesiastical. The ecclesiastical corporation sole is the older
form, dating to the mid-fifteenth century, while the civil corporation sole developed 150 years later when the English monarch was deemed to be a corporation sole.55 The corporation
sole developed as a product of early property law principles
which did not permit the devise of real property to a church in
fee simple absolute. A conveyance to the religious leader (usually a parson or minister) personally thus ran the risk that the
property might descend to the leader's heirs or be subject to
personal debts or encumbrance^.^^ By making the parson and
his successors a corporation, the church accomplished the goal

52. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.CODE9 10002 West 1991).
53. See, e.g., County of San Luis Obispo v. Ashurst, 194 Cal. Rptr. 5, 6-8
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that %]he creditors of the corporation sole may not
look to the assets of the individual holding office, nor may the creditors of the
individual look to the assets held by the corporation sole").
54. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1540.
55. BLACKSTOM, supra note 51, at *469; Frederic W. Maitland, The Corpomtion Sole, 16 L.Q. REV. 335, 337 (1900).
supra note 51, at *469.
56. BLACKSTONE,

456

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I995

of preserving the property of the parsonage for the benefit of
the church; because the present officeholder, his predecessor
and his successor were deemed by law to be one and the same
person, any property given to one was considered the property
of the successor. As it developed in the New England colonies,
the corporation sole functioned as a municipal corporation, and
alienation of property required the consent of the parish.57
While the earliest corporations sole came into existence as
a product of the common law, after the Reformation in England
a corporate charter was required for formation of a corporation
sole.5gWhile the special charter system was used for corporations sole, as for other corporations, during the nineteenth
century, this system was gradually replaced by general corporation statutes. In the case of the corporation sole, however, there
was considerable antipathy to the enactment of such legislation, because the corporation sole was viewed as hierarchical
and anti-democratic. However, at the urging of primarily the
Roman Catholic Church," many states did enact either special legislation permitting the Church to incorporate as a corporation sole or a general incorporation statute permitting corporations sole?' Today, slightly more than half of the states permit some form of the corporation sole, and it is a useful organizational form for many religious groups.
(3) States that permit the corporation
sole. Twenty-six states permit some form of the corporation
sole. Twelve states have explicit corporation sole statutes which
permit religious groups to organize as a corporation sole.61

57. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1504-07.
58. Earlier churches which had operated as a corporation sole before the
charter requirement became prevalent were permitted to continue as corporations
under the fiction of a "lost grant." Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1504. The
Episcopal Church also enjoyed the status of a common law corporation sole in
those states where it was established, although this status was lost as the result
of the disestablishment process. See Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 46
(1815) (noting that the minister of a church was seized of the freehold of church
property while he held office and was capable of transmitting that property to his
successor in the form of a corporation sole).
59. While opposition to the corporation sole was probably based on anti-Roman Catholic sentiment, the Roman Catholic Church favored this corporate form
because it most closely mirrored the theological and doctrinal polity of the church
and, in particular, it assured that church property would be controlled by the
church hierarchy.
60. James B. O'Hara, The Modern Corporation Sole, 93 DICK.
L. REV. 23, 31
(1988).
61. ALA. CODE $5 10-4-1 to -9 (1987); ALASKA STAT. $4 10.40.10--150 (1989);
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These twelve states share similar statutory patterns, although
there is variation on specific provisions. An additional three
states have statutes which appear to allow some form of the
corporation sole in that they either allow a form of organization
similar to the corporation sole but not explicitly described as a
corporation sole, or limit the corporation sole form to certain
religion^.^^ Nine states have either passed special legislative
acts granting certain religious groups (or certain bodies within
a particular religion) the authority to incorporate as a corporation sole or at one time had a corporation sole statute that has
since been repealed. The case law in these states describes
some religious organizations as corporations sole, but there is
no current statute that allows newly organized religious groups

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 10-421 to -427 (1988 & Supp. 1994); CAL. CORP. CODE
$9 10000-10015 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. $9 7-52-101 to -106 (West 1990);
HAW. REV. STAT. 88 419-1 to -9 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. 88 35-3-101 to -209
(1993); NEV. REV. STAT. $8 84.010-.080 (1994); OR. REV. STAT. 8 65-067 (Supp.
1994); UTAH CODE ANN. $8 16-7-1 to -14 (Michie 1991 & Michie Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODEANN. $8 24.12.010-.040 (West 1994); WYO. STAT.88 17-8-101 to 117 (1989).
62. The North Carolina statute is the most similar to the typical corporation
sole statute. It allows a duly appointed bishop, minister, or other ecclesiastical
officer many of the same powers as a corporation sole, including the power to
acquire, hold, or sell church property whenever the laws of the church permit it.
In addition, in the event of the transfer, removal, resignation, or death of the
officer, such property vests in the duly elected successor to the office. However, the
statute does not specifically refer to such an office as a corporation sole. N.C. GEN.
STAT.8 61-5 (1989). New Hampshire appears to allow the minister of a church or
religious society to act as a corporation sole only in reference to parsonage lands
and with the limitation that unless the minister has the consent of the parish, no
conveyance made by the minister is valid for longer than the minister continues to
hold office. N.H. REV. STAT.ANN. $8 306:6-:8 (1984).
The Idaho Nonprofit Corporations Act appears to allow a form of organization
similar in operation to a corporation sole. According to the statute, corporations
sole created under the prior statute will be deemed single director, nonmembership
corporations. IDAHOCODE8 30-304 (1980). Thus, it may follow that a church or
religious society incorporating under Idaho's current law could organize as a single
director, nonmembership corporation which would then be very similar in operation
to the corporation sole. Id. $8 30-308, -315, -318(e). By extension, one might further
posit that any not-for-profit corporation organizing in Idaho might attain similar
advantages by choosing to incorporate as a single director, nonmembership corporation.
Finally, the Michigan statute permits only Roman Catholic bishops and Protestant Episcopal bishops to form corporations sole. The statute grants a Roman Catholic bishop a full set of corporate powers but only grants a hotestant Episcopal
bishop authority to deal with property. MICH. COW. LAWS ANN. $8 458.1-.2, .271.273 (West 1994).
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to incorporate as a corporation sole.63In addition, two states
recognize the common law corporation sole.64
b. Functioning of a corporation sole. ( I ) T yp i c a l
statutory provisions. With only one e x ~ e p t i o n ,all
~ ~ states
that permit the formation of a corporation sole limit its use to
religious organizations. In some cases, the statutes further
limit the permissible purposes of a corporation sole to the management of the property of a religious group for such objectives
as the benefit of the religion itself, works of charity, and public
worship.66 In general, the presiding officer of any church or
religious society is authorized by statute to form a corporation
sole if it is done in conformance with the rules and canons of
the religious entity and if title to the property of the religious

63. District of Columbia, see, e.g., Dietrich v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustments, 293 A.2d 470 (D.C. 1972) (Archbishop of Washington described as
a corporation sole); Illinois, see, e.g., Fintak v. Catholic Bishop, 366 N.E.2d 480 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1977) (Catholic Bishop of Chicago described as a corporation sole); Kentucky, see, e.g., Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957) (Roman
Catholic Bishop of Louisville described as a corporation sole); Maine, see, e.g., Parent v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 436 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981) (Roman Catholic Bishop of
Portland described as a corporation sole); Maryland, see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 229 A.2d 120 (Md. 1966) (Archbishop of Baltimore described as a
corporation sole); Massachusetts, see, e.g., Director of the Div. of Employment Sec.
v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 420 N.E.2d 322 (Mass. 1981) (Roman Catholic bishop of
the diocese of Springfield described as a corporation sole); New Hampshire, see,
e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 345 A.2d 412 (N.H.1975) (Roman Catholic Bishop of
Manchester described as a corporation sole); New Mexico, see, e.g., Moya v. Catholic Archdiocese, 587 P.2d 425 (N.M. 1978) (Catholic Archdiocese of New Mexico described as a corporation sole); South Carolina, see, e.g., Decker v. Bishop of
Charleston, 147 S.E.2d 264 (S.C. 1966) (Bishop of Charleston described as a corporation sole created by legislative act). Although not permitting incorporation of a
new corporation sole, the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporations Act provides for
the amendment of the charter of a corporation sole, S.C. CODEANN. 8 33-31-140
(Law. Co-op. 1990).
64. Arkansas, see, e.g., City of Little Rock v. Linn, 432 S.W.2d 455 (Ark.
1968); Florida, see, e.g., Reid v. Barry, 112 So. 846 (Fla. 1927).
65. Arizona permits the formation of a corporation sole for the purpose of
acquiring, holding and disposing of the property of scientific research institutions
maintained solely for pure research without expectation of pecuniary gain or profit.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. 8 10-421 (1993).
66. For example, the Utah statute states: "Corporations sole may be formed
for acquiring, holding or disposing of church or religious society property for the
benefit of religion, for works of charity and for public worship." UTAH CODEANN.
8 16-7-1 (1991); see also ALASKA STAT. 5 10.40.010 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
8 10-421 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. 8 84.010 (1994); WYO. STAT.8 17-8-109 (1989).
Other statutes state the permissible purposes more broadly; for example, the
Hawaii statute allows a corporation sole to organize for the purposes of "administering and managing the affairs, property, and temporalities of the church." HAW.
REV. STAT. $ 419-1 (1993); see also CAL. CORP. CODE8 10002 (West 1991).
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group is vested in that person? The process of incorporation,B8 the powers granted by statute to the corporation
sole," and the methods of d i s s o l ~ t i o nare
~ ~ usually comparable to those delineated for general not-for-profit corporations."
Perhaps the most distinctive area of functioning for a corporation sole is the manner of providing for vacancy in and
succession to the corporation sole office. In general, upon the
death, resignation, or removal of the person who is the corporation sole, the successor in office is vested with the title of all
property held by the officer's predecessor, with the same power
and authority over the property and subject to the same legal
liabilities and obligations with reference to the pr~perty.'~
Some statutes also deal with the particular problems of interim
vacancy in the office73and the situation of an individual who

67. For example, the Nevada statute provides:
An archbishop, bishop president, trustee in trust, president of stake, president of congregation, overseer, presiding elder, district superintendent or
other presiding officer or clergyman of a church or religious society or
denomination, who has been chosen, elected or appointed in c o n f o d t y
with the constitution, canons, rites, regulations, or discipline of the church
or religious society or denomination, and in whom is vested the legal title
to property held for . . . the church or religious society or denomination,
may make and subscribe written articles of incorporation . . . .
NEV. REV. STAT. 8 84.020 (1994); see also CAI,. COW. CODE8 10002 (West 1991)
(speci*ng the "bishop, chief priest, presiding elder, or other presiding officer"); OR.
REV. STAT.8 65-067 (Supp. 1994) (specifying "any individual").
68. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. 8 35-3-202 (1993). A few statutes present
variations. For example, Alaska requires the articles of incorporation to state the
estimated value of property owned by the corporation at the time of executing the
articles of incorporation, ALASKA STAT. 8 10.40.040(3) (1989), and California requires a statement explaining the method for filling a vacancy in the incorporated
office according to the rules, regulations or constitution of the religious group, CAL.
COW. CODE8 10003(d) (West 1991).
69. See, e.g., ALA. CODE8 10-4-4 (1987). The corporation sole may be explicitly exempted from any general requirement that the membership of the religious
group must consent to property transfers. UTAHCODEANN. 8 16-7-7 (1991).
70. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 8 1 0 4 7 (1987); ALASKA STAT. 8 10.40.150 (1989);
CAL. COW. CODE 8 10012-10015 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. 8 419-8 (1993);
UTAH CODEANN. 5 16-7-12 (1991).
71. Oregon, for example, explicitly places the corporation sole under its general not-for-profit corporation statute, as a form of religious corporation, and subjects
it to the same statutory treatment, differing only in that the corporation sole is
managed by a single director without a board of directors. OR. REV. STAT.8 65-067
(Supp. 1994).
72. See, e.g., ARLZ. REV. STAT.ANN. $ 10-426 (1988).
73. The incorporated officeholder may appoint an administrator to act in case
of temporary vacancy or, in the absence of such an administrator, the superior
ecclesiastical authority to whom the officeholder is subject may appoint an administrator. The administrator must file an application for a certificate of
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was not formally incorporated as a corporation sole but who, a t
the time of death, resignation or removal, was holding title to
trust property for the use or benefit of a religious group.74
(2) J u d i c i a l t r e a t m e n t of c o r p o r a t i o n s
sole. There seems to be relatively little case law dealing with
particular issues involving the corporation sole. Most of the
cases merely describe the office involved as a corporation sole
but do not treat the corporation sole differently than other legal
s t r u ~ t u r e sOccasionally,
.~~
a tendency to treat the corporation
sole with deference does appear in judicial opinions.76One area of uncertainty seems to involve the application of the principallagency theory of liability to a corporation sole. While a corporation sole seems to bear liability on an agency theory when
the matter involved is business-related (as would any other
corporation), at least one court has held that the corporation
sole does not bear liability when the agenky issue involves an
ecclesiastical, rather than a business, matter.??
administratorship with the secretary of state. See, e-g., ALA. CODEQ 10-4-6 (1987);
COLO. REV. STAT.8 7-52-104 (1990). On the other hand, Montana permits the superior ecclesiastical authority to appoint a board of advisors to exercise the powers
of the corporation or to further delegate the executive and administrative functions
of the corporation to an elected administrator. MONT.CODEANN. Q 35-3-208 (1993).
74. These statutes specifically provide that such property shall be deemed to
be in abeyance until the vacancy is filled and shall then vest immediately in the
successor without any further required act or deed so as to prevent either a reversion of the property to the donor or a vesting of the property in the heirs of the
deceased officeholder. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. Q 10.40.120 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. Q 10-427 (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. Q 7-52-105 (1990); UTAHCODEANN. Q 167-10 (Michie 1991); WYO. STAT.Q 17-8-117 (1989). These provisions allow religious
groups which have not met the formal statutory requirements for incorporation as
a corporation sole to enjoy the most important advantage of this organizational
form in that succession to church property is thus permitted.
75. See, e.g., Property Assocs., Inc. v. Archbishop of Guam, No. 93-00003A,
1993 WL 470277 (D. Guam Oct. 12, 1993) (describing archbishop as corporation
sole in dispute involving termination of a lease); St. Gregory's Church v. O'Connor,
477 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church of the
Diocese of Tucson described as a corporation sole in a negligence suit); Larson v.
Archdiocese of Denver, 631 P.2d 1163 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (Archdiocese of Denver
described as a corporation sole in a negligence action); Corporation of the President
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints v. Wallace, 590 P.2d 343 (Utah
1979) (church president described as a corporation sole in case involving issuance
of a restraining order due to disruptive conduct of the defendant).
76. See, e.g., Hurley v. Werly, 203 So. 2d 530, 534 (Fla. 1967) (reversing a
lower court decision which decreed specific performance of a real estate contract
against the Bishop of the Diocese of St. Augustine because the Bishop had failed
to appear a t a deposition and stating that because the corporation sole has protective attributes, the lower court should have, "in deference to his privileged legal
status, proceeded more cautiously than precipitately").
77. The Alabama Supreme Court refused to hold a corporation sole liable for

ASSOCIATIONAL STRUCTURES
(3) Advantages and disadvantages. The main
advantage of the corporation sole is the ability of the legal
structure to mirror the doctrinal structure of a religious group
in terms of property ownership, authority and control. This
advantage makes the corporation sole an attractive option for
religious groups with hierarchical polity. The corporation sole is
also advantageous because it insures that the property of the
religious group will pass to the successor of the corporation sole
a t the death of the incumbent. It is viewed as a secure method
of owning property, free of the risk of members or trustees
using their property ownership to pressure the religious group
on doctrinal issues. In addition, it is more secure than fee simple ownership by the officeholder, which carries the associated
risks that the property may pass to the officer's heirs or creditors rather than remaining with the religious group.
On the other hand, these same advantages may also be
considered disadvantages. While the concentration of assets
and authority in one person may reflect a religious group's
doctrinal structure, it may also lead to confusion between personal and religious assets, difficulty in government monitoring,
and lack of accountability or proper controls. The individual
who is the corporation sole has extensive powers, and complete
authority vests in that per~on.'~
There is a risk that unlimited
authority by one who is not legally subject to the will of the
membership of the religious group or other directors could lead
to abuses. However, although the corporation sole may have
great legal autonomy, there may be safeguards within the
church organization to prevent abuses." The corporation sole
the actions of a priest in damaging a n abortion clinic and found that the bishop's
relationship with the priest was ecclesiastical in nature. The court relied on the
fact that according to Alabama's corporation sole statute, a corporation sole's functions related to conducting business, not to ecclesiastical duties, and thus no liability could be created on the part of the corporation sole unless a business activity
were involved. Wood v. Benedictine Soc'y, 530 So. 2d 801, 805 (Ma. 1988). A California appellate court, on the other hand, held a corporation sole liable on an
agency theory in a wrongful death action based on a car accident in which a priest
was involved, without addressing the question of whether the underlying matter
was ecclesiastical or business-related. The court concluded that there was agency
liability because the bishop had the right to control the priest's activities within its
jurisdiction and the priest was acting within the scope of the agency when the
accident occurred. Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171, 178 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975).
78. See, e.g., Estate of Zabriskie, 158 Cal. Rptr. 154, 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)
(stating that "[tlhe will and judgment alone of the presiding officer regulate his
acts, like any other individual acting in his own right").
79. O'Hara, supm note 60, a t 30-31 (stating that in the Roman Catholic
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form clearly offers significant advantages to religious groups
that find that form the most appropriate for their theological
principles.

D. States That Prohibit Incorporation of Religious Organizations
The constitutions of two states, Virginia and West Virginia,
bar the granting of a charter of incorporation to any church or
religious den~mination.~'The reasons for this anomalous
treatment of religious organizations seem to lie in the strong
historical tradition of Virginia, a tradition that dates to the
Revolutionary period and Virginians Thomas Jefferson and
James adi is on.^' The theories of church-state separationism
and religious liberty professed by Madison and Jefferson are
reflected in Virginia's constitutional ban against the granting of
a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination. It has also been suggested that these prohibitions are the
descendants of English mortmain statutes.82
Church, approval of a board of consultors is now required on major property decisions).
80. VA. CONST.art. IV, 9 14; W. VA. CONST.art. VI, 4 47. The constitution of
South Carolina expressly prohibits special laws, but not general laws, relating to
the incorporation of religious institutions as well as a variety of other charitable
and not-for-profit corporations and business corporations. S.C. CODEANN. 5 33-3110 (Law. Co-op. 1990). It is not unusual for state constitutions to address matters
of concern to religious groups, but these are typically restricted to provisions regarding the free exercise of religion, prohibitions against aid to religious groups,
tax exemptions to religious institutions, and protection of civil rights regardless of
religious beliefs. Individual state constitutional provisions regarding religion are
examined in CHESTERJ. ANTIEAUET A . . , RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, a t 1528; Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing Separation of Church and State Through State Constitutiona l Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625 (1985).
81. The development of Virginia's church-state relationship began in 1609
with the establishment of the Anglican Church (later the Episcopal Church), CORD,
supra note 41, at 4. A disestablishment movement had begun by 1784, led by
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, id. a t 121. In 1784, the General Assessment
Bill was introduced into the Virginia legislature and was intended to raise funds to
support "Teachers of the Christian Religionn through compulsory public payments.
ROBERTS. ALLEY, THE SUPREMECOURTON CHURCHAND STATE10 (1988); RICHARD
E. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURTAND RELIGION 18-19 (1972). Madison's wellknown pamphlet, "A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,"
was authored to oppose the assessment. In the 1785 session of the General Assembly, the legislature defeated the assessment bill and passed Jefferson's Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom, which remains in the Virginia code today. VA.
CODE ANN. 8 57-1 (Michie 1986); see also MORGAN,
supra, a t 19-24; ALLEY, supra,
a t 12-15; GERARD
V. BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONSHIPS
IN AMERICA37, 14950 (1987); CORD,supra note 41, at 4-47.
82. See, e.g., Osnes v. Morris, 298 S.E.2d 803, 805 W. Va. 1982) ("rhe prime
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It is also possible to conclude that the constitutional ban
was intended to prevent the potential favoritism created by the
granting of special corporate charters to religious organizat i o n ~ , 'rather
~
than to prevent all incorporation of religious
organizations. In any case, the Virginia Nonstock Corporation
Act now permits an organization to incorporate under it for any
lawful purposeM and mentions elsewhere religious purpose
among the permitted purposes. It appears that several organizations with religious purposes but which are not per se
churches or other specific denominational organizations do in
fact incorporate pursuant to these provisions. In addition, it
seems that denominational groups (such as individual church-

object of mortmain acts was to repress the alarming influence of ecclesiastical
corporations, which had, even as early as the Norman conquest, monopolized so
much of the land in England, that the Abbot of St. Albans told the conqueror that
the reason why he had subjugated the country by the single victory a t Hastings
was because the land, which was the maintenance of martial men, was given and
converted to pious employments and for the maintenance of holy votaries".).
83. The Virginia Constitution states, "The General Assembly shall not grant a
charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination . . . ." VA. CONST.
art. 4, 8 14, para. 20. Thus, by its literal terms, the constitution only prohibits
legislatively created religious corporations but does not seem to prohibit religious
corporations created by some other method, as is now the case under the Virginia
Nonstock Corporation Act, which is a general incorporation statute. See A.E. DICK
HOWARD,1 COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF VIRGINIA 545-46 (1974) (arguing that these provisions represent a "safeguard against an establishment of religion, since the legislature will not be in a position, by chartering some churches
but not others, to give preferment to any denomination or religion").
84. Both Virginia and West Virginia not-for-profit corporation statutes allow
not-for-profit corporations to be organized broadly for "any lawful purpose or purposes." VA. CODE ANN. $ 13.1-825 (Michie 1994); W. VA. CODE $ 31-1-7 (1994)
(listing examples of lawful purposes as including, but not limited, to: charitable,
benevolent, eleemosynary, educational, civic, patriotic, social, fraternal, literary,
cultural, athletic, scientific, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and professional, commercial, industrial or trade association). Although such a broad statement of permissible purpose would seem to include incorporation of churches or
religious denominations, both states have provisions within their state constitutions
prohibiting the incorporation of churches or religious denominations. VA. CONST.
art. 4, 8 14, para. 20 ("[Tlhe General Assembly shall not grant a charter of incorporation to any church or religious denomination, but may secure title to church
property to an extent to be limited by law".); W. VA. CONST. $ 47 (stating, "[nlo
charter of incorporation shall be granted to any church or religious denomination.
Provisions may be made by general laws for securing the title to church property,
and for the sale and transfer thereof, so that it shall be held, used, or transferred
for the purposes of such church, or religious denomination"). In West Virginia, this
constitutional prohibition is specifically included within the previously mentioned
"purposes of incorporation" section of the West Virginia code. W. VA. CODE4 31-17(c); see also Lunsford, Withrow & Co. v. Wren, 68 S.E. 308 (W.Va. 1908) (noting
the constitutional prohibition on the granting of articles of incorporation to a
church and a church's incompetency to sue or be sued or to enter into contracts).
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es, synagogues, or mosques) incorporate funds for the purpose
of holding financial assets; yet the denominational group does
not itself in~orporate.~'
Whether this is the result of a perceived constitutional ban or merely the continuation of a tradition is difficult to determine.
In addition to these apparent or real obstacles to incorporation, the Virginia statutes place a limit on the amount of real
and personal property that a religious denomination may

85. In both Virginia and West Virginia, churches and other denominational
groups are able to become involved in not-for-profit incorporation. For example, for
purposes of incorporation in West Virginia, a "religious-oriented" organization will
not be deemed a "church or religious denomination" if it will have no "ecclesiastical
control" of persons engaged in religious worship and will not prescribe the forms of
such worship. See Op. Att'y Gen. 252 (1957) (permitting a group whose stated
purpose was to "win people to Christ" through evangelism and missionary work to
incorporate because each individual was free to select the church or denomination
of his choice). Auxiliary or para-church organizations have been incorporated with
the purpose of maintaining or operating child care centers, retirement homes, education funds, fellowship funds, and preservation funds, even when such groups
have an explicit denominational affiliation. Religious groups seem to follow the
method of incorporating a fund for the purpose of owning property which is then
used to support the activities of the group, but without the group itself formally
incorporating. See, e.g., Westminster-Canterbury of Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of
Virginia Beach, 385 S.E.2d 561, 562 (Va. 1989) (describing corporation organized by
the Episcopal Diocese and the Presbyterian Church to own and operate a housing
and health-care facility as a nonstock corporation "organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes"); St. John's Protestant Episcopal
Church Endowment Fund, Inc. v. Vestry of St. John's Protestant Episcopal Church,
377 S.E.2d 375, 376 (Va. 1989) (describing the fund as incorporated in order "to
acquire and establish in perpetuity a fund . . . and to appropriate the income
therefrom . . . to the preservation, insurance and improvements of the real and
[personal] property [of the church] and also to its religious, charitable and benevolent uses"); St. Paul A.M.E. Church House Corp. v. Buckeye Union Ins., 379 F.
Supp. 562, 563 (S.D.W. Va. 1974) (stating purpose of church housing corporation
was to "build a number of low-cost public apartment house units for rental"); Application of Virginia United Methodist Homes, Inc., No. SEC940121, 1994 WL
725338 (Va. Corporation Commission Nov. 18, 1994) (describing Virginia United
Methodist Homes, Inc. as incorporated under the Nonstock Corporation Act in an
application to be exempt from securities registration requirements); Application of
Southeastern District-LCMS Church Extension Fund, Inc., No. SEC940035, 1994
W L 258467 (Va. Corporation Commission Apr. 28, 1994) (describing religiously
affiliated fund as incorporated exclusively for "religious, educational, charitable and
benevolent purposes" under the Nonstock Corporation Act in an application for
exemption from securities registration requirements); Application of the Christian
Broadcasting Network, Inc., No. SEC930080, 1993 W L 359564 (Va. Corporation
Commission Aug. 9, 1993) (describing religiously afliliated network as incorporated
under the Nonstock Corporation Act with a "religious, educational, and charitable
purpose" in an application for exemption from securities registration requirements).
Op. Att'y Gen., June 23, 1969 (permitting a West Virginia Christian recreational
center, which was nondenominational and nonsectarian, and where no specific
church was represented, to incorporate).
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own? Despite its origin, to whatever extent this prohibition
is retained, it appears outdated in light of the prevailing view
that permits incorporation of religious organizations under
general incorporation statutes. Furthermore, limitations or
obstacles to the ability to incorporate or to own property that
are not generally applicable to all charitable or not-for-profit
organizations would seem to raise serious questions of constitutionality under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

E. The Element of Choice
The myriad of choices offered by the variations in structural forms available to religious organizations in the different
states leads to two hrther issues. The first issue is the extent
of flexibility offered to a religious group in choosing a structural form when the applicable state statutes seem to offer more
than one possibility, and the extent to which this choice may
affect other particular burdens or exemptions that will be
granted to the religious group as a result of this choice. The
second issue is whether a religious organization that functions
primarily in a different state could incorporate in a state that
permits the existence of a structural form that is particularly
advantageous in that the legal form would more closely mirror
the group's religious polity. Both these questions lead to the
corollary issue, which will be addressed in the next section, of
whether the exclusion of a legal form which best mirrors the
theology of a particular religion is a violation of the group's
right to free exercise of religion.

86. Specific statutes permit religious groups to own property. VA. CODE ANN.
$ 57-7.1 (Michie 1994); W. VA CODE $ 35-1-1 (1994). However, in Virginia, the

trustees may not hold property for religious purposes which exceeds 15 acres of
land in a city or town, or 250 acres outside of a city or town and within the same
county. The local government may permit the holding of up to 50 acres within a
town or city under certain circumstances. The trustees may not hold personal property which exceeds $10 million in worth. VA. CODEANN. $ 57-12 (Michie 1994). In
West Virginia, the statute has recently been amended to permit trustees to hold 10
acres of land within a city, town or village and 60 acres outside of a city, town or
village. There is no limitation placed on the amount of personal property which
may be owned. W. VA. CODE$ 35-1-8 (1994); W.VA H.B. 2569, 72nd Legislature
(1995). These limits are not, however, applicable only to religious groups.
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1. Choice of structural forms within a state
With such a great variety of statutory incorporation forms
available, not only among the different states but even within
the same state, it becomes necessary to consider the extent of
choice that a religious organization has when considering the
type of legal structure to adopt. In every state except Virginia
and West Virginia, a religious organization would have the
option of incorporating as a not-for-profit or nonstock corporation. In states whose statutes make no provision for specific
forms of religious corporations, this may also be the only
choice. However, most states offer more than one statutory
model, and so some of the possible variations and choices will
now be considered.
A few states require religious organizations to incorporate
under the religious corporation or religious societies statute. Although these states have a not-for-profit corporation act, they
require the special provisions pertaining to religious corporations to govern the formation of those corporation^.^' On the
other hand, most states with more than one type of incorporation statute do not specifically mention whether a religious
organization may choose under which statute to incorporate; in
the absence of a specific prohibition, the ability to choose would
seem apparent.88
Yet another variant is offered by those states that include
among their statutory models the specific denominational statutes in addition to the more general forms of statutes. Many of
these states permit a religious group to incorporate under
whichever statute it ch0oses,8~but a few states limit the
87. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 27, 8 101 (1994); MD. CODEANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS
REV. STAT.ANN. 8 306.4 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT.8 55-A3(A)(3) (1990); OHIO REV. CODEANN. 8 1702.03 (Baldwin 1995).
88. Many of the statutes specifically mention that a religious society may
incorporate under them. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.88 7-20-104, 7-40-106, 7-50-101,
7-51-101 (1995); D.C.CODEANN. $5 29-504, -1001 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805,
$8 105f103.05, 110/35 (1995); KAN. STAT.ANN. $5 17-1701, 17-6001(b) (1993); MINN.
STAT.ANN. $8 315.01, 315.05 (1995); MO. ANN. STAT. $8 355.025, 352.010 (1995);
OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 18, $8 562, 1002(A) (West 1995). A Missouri statute specifically states that the right of a religious group to organize as it wishes is not affected by the statute. MO. ANN. STAT.8 355.500 (1995).
89. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 67, $8 23, 40, 44 West 1995) (permitting a religious group to incorporate under the religious society provisions or
under the denominational statutes for Methodist, Episcopal, and Roman Catholic
churches); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 88 450.159, 450.178, 450.3302, 458.262, 458.428
(West 1995) (allowing a choice to religious groups whether to incorporate under
trustee corporation provisions, ecclesiastical corporation provisions, not-for-profit

8 5-302 (1994); N.H.

4391

ASSOCIATIONAL STRUCTURES

467

choices available to particular denominations." Those statutes
that limit the choices available to specific religious groups,
particularly when a group is required to incorporate under a
particular denominational provision would probably not be
viewed by adherents of that denomination as an infringement
on their freedom of religious choice. By the same token, however, the existence of the denominational statutes is presumably
the product of a lobbying effort by the denomination itself and
may thus raise the question of a preference granted to particular religious groups. It is apparent that those states that do not
have denominational provisions or that limit such provisions to
a select group of denominations are implicitly limiting the
choices of those groups that do not have the benefit of such
provisions. Furthermore, the limited presence of the corporation sole as a structural choice raises questions of limitations
on a religious group's ability to choose, particularly when that
form is best-suited to a group's religious polity.
2. Foreign corporations

It is also necessary to consider the obverse of the question
of the element of choice, which involves the ability of a religious group that has been formed in one state to function in a
different state. Following the model of the business corporation
statutes, many states provide in their general not-for-profit
corporation statute or religious corporation statute for the operation of foreign corporations within that state.g1 The issue

corporation provisions, or specific denominational statutes); N.J. STAT. ANN.
$8 15A.2-l(b); 16:2-12, 16:5-1, 16~3-1,16:lOA-2, 16:ll-1, 16~12-1,16~13-1,16:lOA-2,
16:ll-1, 16:12-1, 16:13-1, 16:15-1, 16:16-1, 16:17-3 (West 1995) (allowing religious
groups to incorporate as either a not-for-profit corporation or under one of 10 specific denominational statutes); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 901, 2861, 3021,
2982, 2986 (West 1994) (granting a choice to religious groups).
90. See, e.g., CONN.GEN. STAT.ANN. 58 33-264a, 33-500, 33-268, 33-279 (West
1995) (generally permitting a choice whether to organize under the Religious Corporation and Societies provision, the specially chartered corporations provision, or
the specific denominational provisions, but prohibiting formation as a nonstock
corporation); WE.STAT.ANN. 48 181.03, 187.01, 187.12, 181.76(3) (West 1995) (generally permitting a choice whether to incorporate as a nonstock corporation or
under religious societies statutes but excluding Roman Catholic churches from the
religious society provisions).
91. Most states seem to permit foreign not-for-profit corporations to perform
the same activities as domestic corporations. In some cases, the foreign corporation
may be required to register or obtain a certificate from the secretary of state, see,
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 6 24.03.305 (1995), while in other states there are no requirements, see, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 181.66 (1995). Most statutes limit the foreign
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that this poses is whether a religious organization that desires
to operate in one state, the statutes of which do not expressly
provide for the structural model that the organization prefers,
could incorporate in a different state that does offer the preferred structure. In an analogy to the Delaware business corporation, a particular religious organization could incorporate in a
state that provides for a particular corporate form, such as a
denominational form or corporation sole, and then operate and
conduct business in a state that does not specifically permit the
incorporation of this type of corporation. While there seems to
be virtually no case law on this subject, the statutes of many
states would seem to permit this arrangement. Whether this
would create collateral issues or complications, such as in the
ownership of property by a foreign entity, is not clear in the
current state of the law.
The one caveat to such an arrangement, however, is that
religious organizations need to consider a variety of issues in
addition to the availability of particular corporate structures.
For example, some states grant exemptions from certain regulations to religious corporations. Perhaps the most common
example is the exemption from registration requirements imposed on other types of not-for-profit corporation^.^^ A more
interesting question arises in those states that exempt volunteer directors and officers of not-for-profit corporations from
liability for simple negligen~e.'~Such protection would today
be considered highly desirable and would thus provide a considerable incentive to incorporate in such a state.

corporation to acting in ways permitted to similar domestic corporations, and some
specifically state that "nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to regulate the organization or the internal affairs of a foreign corporation." Id.
5 181.66(1). It would seem to be possible for a particular corporation to organize in
a state which permits corporations sole and then to conduct activities in a state
which does not but which has such a specific provision.
92. While the considerable majority of states that impose particular requirements under Solicitation Acts exempt religious organizations fiom those requirements, four states do not. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17510-17510.7 (West 1990);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $9 51:1901-1907 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9
$8 5001-5016 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 5 162.3 (1994)
(exempting religious institutions which comply with I.R.C. O 501(c)(3) and which
are supported primarily by government grants and funds solicited fiom their own
membership). A state's ability to regulate solicitation would be restricted to its own
jurisdiction but would subject foreign corporations to the same requirements as
domestic corporations.
93. See, e.g., ILL. h 4 N . STAT. ch. 805 5 1051108.70 (1995) (exempting uncompensated officers and directors from liability except for willful and wanton conduct).
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INSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
TO THE

FIRSTAMENDMENT
This discussion of legal structures available to religious
organizations leads to the crux of the dilemma that must be
confronted-the relationship between legal structure and the
While it is not necreligion clauses of the First A~nendment.'~
essary for a religious organization to adopt formally any legal
structure in order to carry out its religious mission or even to
attain favorable tax status, if the religious organization wishes
to attain various other advantages, then it must squeeze itself
into the mold of one of the legal forms that a particular state
chooses to make available, regardless of how well or how poorly
the particular mold may fit the theology of the particular religion. Many religious organizations now take those advantages
for granted; in fact, they often regard them as necessary to the
carrying out of their religious mission. As a result, the question
of the extent to which the available forms fit the theology of a
particular religious group directly implicates the concerns of
the Free Exercise Clause.
On the other hand, those who work (both as practitioners
and as legal theoreticians) in the field of not-for-profit and
charitable organizations question whether the creation of special exemptions for religious groups, in their organizational
form, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In sum, the question posed is whether religious organizations, as institutions rather than as aggregates of individuals,
should be held accountable to both government and society as a
whole by the same standards as other charitable organizations
or whether they should be largely exempt from such accountability because of the First Amendment.
The question of accountability and responsibility of religious organizations under the law is a complex and intriguing
one that illustrates well the conflict between an individualoriented and an institution-oriented constitutional jurisprudence of civil liberties. The extent to which laws can require or

94. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
Establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The Supreme Court has generally treated this provision as embodying
two distinct clauses and two distinct values pertaining to the status of religion and
its relationship to the government. However, their interpretation and interconnee
tedness are complex and produce little agreement. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon &
Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 477 (1991).
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prohibit conduct that contradicts religious mandate is central
to the questions of the relationship among religious institutions, individuals, society and government and brings out a
fundamental conflict between two deeply rooted values-the
desire to protect freedom of religion and the desire to hold all
equally accountable under the law.
The requirement to submit to governmental regulation has
always applied in the United States to conduct and not at all to
religious belief, the latter being entirely exempt from governmental interference." Individuals and religious organizations
are, however, at least to some extent accountable to society for
their conduct and activities under governmental reg~lation.'~
The proponents for an expansive approach to religious free
exercise have asserted the need for a "constitutionally compelled" or a "judicially created" exemption from such regulation
when the regulation unduly burdens the fkee exercise of relimodern constitutional jurisprudence until
g i ~ n . ' Throughout
~
1990, the boundaries of such accountability were determined by
requiring a compelling state interest to justie the burden imposed on the free exercise of religion.98Through the applica95. The freedom of belief, whether grounded in what would be generally recognized as a religious belief or in a more secular conscientious belief, has been
given absolute protection under both the Free Exercise Clause and the Free Speech
Clause. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
96. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice and Peace v.
INS, 910 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1990) ("These clauses have been interpreted as providing full protection for religious beliefs but only limited protection for overt acts
prompted by those beliefs."). For criticisms of this belieuaction dichotomy in First
Amendment jurisprudence, see, e.g., Shelley K. Wessels, Note, The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1201, 1207-08 (1989).
97. The argument for such an exemption is essentially that the attempt to
impose governmental regulation in conflict with religious mandate creates a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. For a strong presentation in support of a broad interpretation of accommodation and exemptions for
religious interests, see Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An UpL. REV. 685 (1992).
date and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH.
98. The extent of this accountability was premised on a three-part test which
evaluated: 1) the extent of the governmental interference with sincerely held religious belief, 2) the existence of a compelling state interest to justify the burden
imposed on the free exercise of religion, and 3) the extent to which an exemption
from the regulation would impede the objectives which the government sought to
advance through the regulation. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). This formulation is substantially
similar to the "compelling government interest" test used to evaluate the legitimacy
of governmental interference with other fimdamental freedoms, particularly freedom
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tion of this test, the Supreme Court has produced an arguably
bewildering patchwork of permissible and impermissible forms
of governmental regulation.''
It was this inconsistent patchwork that led the Supreme
Court in 1990, under the leadership of Justice Scalia, to change
fundamentally the evaluation of claims to exemption from governmental regulation based on the right to religious free exercise. In 1990, in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith,@
' '
the Supreme Court disclaimed the applicability of the compelling government interest test for evaluating laws that make no distinctions based on religion. According to Smith, facially neutral governmental regulation
which nonetheless had a disproportionate impact on particular
religious practices would be evaluated under the lowest level of
judicial scrutiny, which requires only that the government have
a legitimate interest in the regulation and that the regulation
be rationally related to that interest. Because it is rare for a
regulation to target only particular religious practices,lO' the

of speech. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
99. For example, parents could direct their children's education, see Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (mandating exemption for members of Old Order
Amish religious groups from state statute requiring school attendance until age 16),
and individuals could not be denied unemployment compensation when their jobs
required them to work on their religiously mandated day of rest or employment
demands conflicted in other ways with their religious beliefs, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (denial of unemployment benefits
because of refusal to work on Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits to applicant
whose religion forbade manufacture of weapons); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (denial of unemployment benefits because of refusal to work on Sabbath).
On the other hand, individuals could be required to comply with various government regulations, including social security laws, see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693
(1986) (federal statute requiring states to use social security numbers in adminintering welfare programs did not violate Native Americans' religious rights); they
could be required to keep their businesses closed on a state-mandated day of rest,
see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); and the government could construct a road and
permit timber-harvesting in a sacred area, see Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
100. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Arguably, the Supreme Court had already abandoned
the compelling government interest test in, for example, Lyng, 485 U.S. 439, and
Bowen, 476 U.S. 693.
101. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (19931,
the Supreme Court held that an ordinance which prohibited the killing of animals
only in connection with sacrifice and ritual purposes was unconstitutional because
it was motivated by anti-religious animus and thus violated the Free Exercise
Clause.
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impact of Smith seemed to be the virtually total elimination of
the constitutionally-compelled exemption of individuals from
otherwise valid, generally applicable governmental regulation.
The application of Smith had thus seemed to usher in a new
era of accountability for religious organizations in that they
would be shielded from such regulation only when it was motivated by an animus against particular religious practices or
when it creates a denominational preference.
Although Congress acted in the fall of 1993 to reverse all
or most of the effects of the Smith decision by enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (or RFRA),lo2the shifts in
religion clause jurisprudence prompted by the Smith decision
should be evaluated as background against which to predict the
next stages of development in religion clause jurisprudence.
During the period between Smith and RFRA, lower courts
began the development of a new method of analyzing claims to
exemption from governmental regulation and other forms of
intrusion upon spheres of religious activity. How this method of
analysis is integrated with RFRA will determine the next stage
of religion clause jurisprudence.
The aftermath of Smith caused a significant analytical
shift in religion clause jurisprudence.lo3 This shift involved
the use of the Establishment Clause to invalidate governmental
regulation when it conflicted with religious beliefs, because the
Free Exercise Clause had been virtually eliminated as an avenue of relief. Hi~torically,'~~
the Establishment Clause was
102. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000bb-1 (1995). RF'RA restored the strict scrutiny, or compelling government interest, test to all regulations and government actions which substantially burden a person's exercise of religion. For a fuller consideration of RFRA,
see infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
103. In addition to the effects of Smith on religion clause jurisprudence within
the United States, Smith had also raised some question about the status of freedom of religion in the United States under international law.
104. The Establishment Clause was, in fact, originally intended to prevent the
federal government from interfering with the state religious establishments which
existed at the end of the eighteenth and into the first half of the nineteenth centuries. See Kauper & Ellis, supra note 1, at 1557-64. Thus, unlike many of the other
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the Establishment Clause was not intended
to give general protection to individuals or even religious institutions, but rather to
protect state-government sponsored religious activity from interference by the federal government. The process of incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which occurred in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and which applied this
restriction to the state governments, thus required a bigger leap than the incorporation of the other fundamental freedoms and, although generally accepted today,
is considerably more controversial from a historical perspective. See School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 25458 (1963) (Breman, J., concur-
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used primarily to evaluate situations in which the government
may create an endorsement or support of a particular religious
viewpoint, as in the cases of public religious symbols,'"
prayer in public schools, and other forms of government-sponsored prayer,lo6 or to confer a benefit on religious institutions, such as public aid to parochial schools.'07
However, during the period afier Smith and before RFRA,
the excessive entanglement prong of the Supreme Court's test
for evaluating government activity under the Establishment
Clauselo8 became the primary vehicle for challenges to govring); Glendon & Yanes, supra note 94, at 480-92 (criticizing incorporation of the
Establishment Clause and the reasoning in Everson).
105. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
106. The subject of religious activity in public schools has been considered by
the Supreme Court in several cases. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992)
(prohibiting state-sponsored "nondenomination" prayer at public school graduation);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down statute mandating balanced treatment for evolution science and creation science); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985) (permitting silent prayer or meditation in schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding that requiring the posting of Ten Commandments
in classrooms violated the Establishment Clause); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968) (striking down statute which prohibited teaching of evolution in public
schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that state-sponsored
daily prayer, even if denominationally neutral and voluntary, violated the Establishment Clause because such prayer served to advance religion); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
107. The Court has considered various forms of government aid to parochial
schools. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking down federal funding
for salaries of public school employees assigned to provide remedial services to lowincome children in parochial schools); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985)
(holding that public funding of full-time parochial schoolteachers to teach secular
subjects is unconstitutional); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (salary supplements for parochial school teachers); see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993) (permitting reimbursement for expenses for deaf child
attending parochial school); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding
federal grants program to public and private social service agencies, including religious agencies); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota tax
deduction for parochial school expenses); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (upholding publicly funded transportation to parochial school). The requiring
of equal access to public school and university facilities for religious organizations
has been approved in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), reversed on remand, 17 F.3d 1425 (1994); Board of Educ. of
Westwide Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); and Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In its most recent decision evaluating government
activity under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court held that the creation
of a school district for the exclusive purpose of providing special education to the
children of a Satmar Hasidic community insulated from the surrounding non-Hasidic communities was unconstitutional. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch.
Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
108. The Supreme Court enunciated a three-part test in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
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ernmental regulation of religious organizations. Although not
part of a free exercise analysis, the test for excessive entanglement was used to strike down governmental regulation that
would otherwise have been permissible under the Smith test.
Thus, what was intended as a method to evaluate the granting
of a governmental benefit to religious organizations became the
test for evaluating the imposition of burdens on religious activity,'Og even though it does not address the question of accountability and responsibility under societal norms, as expressed in
legislative enactments.
The use of the excessive entanglement test to resolve what
were in fact free exercise claims resulted in two further changes in judicial analysis of such issues. The first of these was that
only institutions, and no longer individuals, were able to obtain
exemptions from government regulation. Excessive entanglement analysis emphasizes almost exclusively the relationship
between government and religious institutions, not the relationship between government and individuals who are carrying out
their religious dictates.'" The result of the dichotomy of pro403 US. 602 (1971), to determine when a government action constitutes an impermissible "establishment" of religion: 1) whether the statute or other government
action has a secular purpose, 2) whether its principal or primary effect neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and 3) whether the government action creates an
excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id. at 612-13. Although
the viability of the Lemon test has been hotly debated, it was specifically reaffirmed in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). The test for excessive entanglement has itself been split into three factors: 1) the character and purpose of the
institution involved, 2) the nature of the regulation's intrusion into religious affairs,
and 3) the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.
109. For discussions of the use of excessive entanglement to gain exemption
6.om government regulation before the Smith decision, see Ira Lupu, Free Exercise
Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67
B.U. L. REV. 391, 409-11 (1987), and William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren,
Regulating Religious Organizations Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 293 (1986).
110. Even before enactment of RFRA, some commentators had suggested that
the right of religious free exercise belongs only to individuals and not to institutions at all. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 109, at 419-31; School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 US. 203, 223 (1963) (characterizing the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause
as "to secure religious liberty in the individual"). For criticism of this view, see
Glendon & Yanes, supra note 94, at 495-96. The idea that the Free Exercise
Clause protects only individuals and not institutions makes an appealing basis for
arguments in favor of increased accountability of religious organizations because it
eliminates a category of free exercise challenges to governmental regulation. However, it is diflicult to ignore that at times individuals who belong to a group may
only be able to fulfill their religious dictates through an organizational structure.
Nonetheless, this is not a reason to grant free exercise rights exclusively to reli-
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tection to be granted to individuals and institutions under
Smith is the opposite of what it should be-institutions are
granted free exercise rights, although presented in the guise of
an excessive entanglement challenge, while individuals are
largely denied any right to free exercise based on religious
beliefs.
The second corollary was the reversal of another dichotomy
inherent in evaluating the fundamental freedoms contained in
the Bill of Rights. The protections granted to these fundamental freedoms are generally phrased as negative rights."'
Thus, the government, primarily through the legislature, cannot interfere with these rights, but it has no affirmative obligation to provide or protect these rights. The judiciary, through
its interpretation of the Constitution, can strike down legislative enactments that interfere with these rights. The legislature and, to a large extent, the executive branches are repositories of majoritarian power, and their actions generally reflect
the will of the majority. The judiciary represents a countermajoritarian factor and provides the only protection for the
minority's right to these fundamental freedoms.'12
In his Smith decision, Justice Scalia largely eliminated the
courts as protectors of these minoritarian rights but reiterated
that the legislature is still free to create legislative exemptions
from such regulation for specific religious practices.'" Thus,
religious groups with large numbers of adherents or with greater amounts of political influence would be able to win proteo
tion of their free exercise rights through legislatively-created
exemptions. On the other hand, smaller groups and individuals
who do not possess equivalent political power would be largely

gious organizations while effectively denying them on an individual, minoritarian
basis, as seems to be the dictate of the Smith decision. This tension between the
rights of individuals and the rights of institutions becomes even more significant
when viewed against the earlier discussion of institutional structures available to
religious groups and the concomitant rights and responsibilities which these structures impose upon the religious group.
111. The concept of the "negative" Constitution is more typically used to describe the fact that, with a few exceptions, the government is required only to
refrain from interfering with individuals and not to provide specific benefits or
protections. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88
MICH.L. REV. 2271, 2273-78 (1990).
112. See Charles M. Freeland, The Political Process as Final Solution, 68 IND.
L.J. 525, 526-27 (1993).
113. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. For a critique of reliance on a majoritarian democratic political process to protect fundamental rights, particularly in the context of
Smith, see Freeland, supra note 112, at 560-62.
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unable to achieve either legislatively-created or judicially-created exemptions.
The effects of these analytical shifts may be demonstrated
by some lower court decisions between 1990 and 1993. In accord with the dictates of Smith, these courts refused to entertain free exercise challenges to the imposition of facially neutral government regulations. For example, in Black v. Snyder, a
1991 Minnesota appellate decision, the court rejected a church's
claim to be exempted under the Free Exercise Clause from the
state's human rights statute when the associate pastor brought
claims of employment discrimination, defamation, breach of
contract, and retaliatory discharge against her church and the
senior pastor.ll4 The court dismissed her claims against the
church based on the entanglement prong of the Establishment
Clause but allowed her suit based on sexual harassment
against the senior pastor to continue, explaining that the suit
against the pastor was allowed because it related to conduct
during the employment relationship rather than to the
plaintiffs pastoral qualifications or church doctrine. The
church was thus protected, while the pastor was not. Thus,
although not part of a free exercise analysis, the excessive
entanglement question could be used to strike down governmental regulation that was otherwise considered permissible
under the Smith formulation of free exercise analysis.
In the fall of 1993, Congress enacted RFRA with the explicit purpose of reversing the effects of the Smith decision, providing that the
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability . . . [unless the government] demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person-41) is in furtherance
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.'15

114. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). In NLRB v.
Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965
(1992), the Ninth Circuit relied in part on Smith in denying a religiously affiliated
youth center's claim to be exempt from NLRB jurisdiction under the Free Exercise
Clause.
115. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 14888
(1993) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 5 504; 42 U.S.C. 58 1988, 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1993)).
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These provisions clearly represent an attempt to return to the
judicial standards utilized to evaluate free exercise claims before the Smith decision. However, the statute's provisions concerning "substantial" burdens and, even more significantly, its
apparent emphasis on the burdens placed on the individual's
free exercise of religion remain to be evaluated. Of even greater
interest is the future of RFRA itself. Although several courts
have decided matters under RFFtA,ll6 several commentators
have questioned its viability,"' and one District court
116. RFRA has been considered in approximately 65 federal cases, most of
which implicitly regard it as constitutional or did not consider the question of
constitutionality necessary to decide the case. See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16
F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that RFRA raised questions of constitutionality concerning Congress' powers under 5 5 of the 14th Amendment but that i t
was not necessary to decide this issue); Cheema v. Thompson, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24160, *8-*10 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding Free Exercise Clause violation because school district had failed to use least restrictive means of accomplishing
school safety as required by RFRA); Rust v. Clarke, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5584,
*31 n.12 (April 26, 1995) (noting that neither party questioned the constitutionality
of RFRA); Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538; 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994) (assuming constitutionality of RFRA).
117. Enactment of RFRA has spawned considerable commentary, much of it
presenting general guidelines to RFRA's interpretation and significance. See, e.g.,
Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretative Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 39 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Douglas Laycock,
RFRA, Congress and the Ratchet, 56 MONT.L. REV. 145, 152-69 (1995) (concluding
that Congress does have authority under 5 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enact RFRA); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration
L. REV. 883, 895-97 (1994) (discussing RFRA generally); Douglas
Act, 62 FORDHAM
Laycock & Oliver Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73
TEX. L. REV. 209, 253-54 (1994) (discussing lack of clarity in level of judicial scrutiny utilized before Smith).
Several commentators have also questioned the constitutionality and wisdom of
RFRA. See, e.g., Daniel 0.Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restomtion Act: The
Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT.L. REV. 39, 6079 (1995) (concluding that RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to state and local
laws because Congress exceeded its authority under 5 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the PubliclPrivate Distinction: The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1306-11
(1994) (questioning whether Congress can direct the Supreme Court how to interpret the Constitution); Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437, 44345 (1994) (considering RFRA unconstitutional because i t conflicts with principles of
religious freedom, Congress overstepped its authority under 3 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in attempting to regulate state law, and RFRA violates separation of
powers); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox
into the Henhouse under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO
L. REV. 357, 363-69 (1994) (concluding that in enacting RFRA, Congress
exceeded its constitutional powers); Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX L. REV. 247, 284-307
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has recently declared it to be uncon~titutional.~'~
The preceding discussion of the various associational structures available to religious organizations and the results of the
DePaul University Center for ChurchIState Studies Survey of
Religious Organizations demonstrate that religious organizations choose amongst available legal structures in order to gain
certain advantages. One could therefore posit that if a religious
organization chooses these advantages and thus acts more like
other f o m s of not-for-profit organizations, a different analysis
should be required for those burdens that fall more heavily on
the religious organization in its institutional form than on
individuals.
For example, one might wish to set up a continuum of
types of governmental regulations determined by their relative
impact directly on individuals and their relative impact directly
on religious institutions. While not all types of regulations
would be easily classified, a few examples might demonstrate
the application of such a continuum. At one end of the continuum, one could examine some types of landmark and historic
preservation ordinances that arguably burden only institutions
(most typically the corporate or associational owners of the
buildings) and not individuals, except in their roles as members
of the institution^."^ Such ordinances would therefore not be
(1994) (questioning whether RFRA violates the Establishment Clause and whether
Congress exceeded its powers under 8 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Ira Lupu,
The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 273-75 (1994)
(pointing out possible constitutional difficulties with RFRA); Ira Lupu, Statutes Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 56-59 (1993) (discussing
Congress' power to enact RFRA under the Commerce Clause and $ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227
(1995) (questioning the constitutionality of RFRA under the Establishment Clause,
Free Speech Clause and Equal Protection Clause and suggesting that RFRA be
interpreted to apply only to claims brought by religious institutions and not to
claims brought by individuals); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407 (1992)
(questioning whether RFRA will succeed in expanding upon religious liberty).
118. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (holding
RFRA unconstitutional because it violated separation of powers). But see Hamilton
v. Schriro, 863 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (holding RFRA to be constitutional).
119. See, e.g., Rector, Wardens and Members of the Vestry of St.
Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 353-56 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that application of Landmark Law to prevent a church from building an
office tower did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it does not hinder the
church's religious and charitable mission). For examples in the labor context, see
Tony and Susan Alarno Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985)
(application of Fair Labor Standards Act to religious organization); King's Garden,
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subject to the compelling government interest test established
in RFRA, but rather to a lower level of scrutiny.
At the other extreme end of the continuum would fall religious practices that are undertaken largely by individuals separated from the institutional structure adopted by a religious
group. The best example here is the factual basis of Smith, in
which the smoking of peyote, although sometimes engaged in
within a group context, bears no relation to the formal strucA middle
ture or corporate aspects of the religious
ground, and perhaps the thorniest issue, is represented by
controversies involving the application of anti-discrimination
laws to religious organizations and, in particular, to clergy.121
In these situations, although the actor seems to be an institution or corporation, the institution may in fact be acting merely
as an aggregate of individuals rather than exclusively in its
institutional capacity.
This summary of the current law in the United States
concludes with a few obsemations and suggestions for future
thought. First, the limited availability of structural forms for
religious groups with different theological polities may place an
undue or excessive burden on the free exercise of religion,
which falls unevenly on religions with different polities. This
inequality should prompt states to make available a wider
array of structural forms and, in particular, to permit religious
organizations to adopt the corporation sole form when they so
wish.
An expansion of available structural forms, however, leads
to the second question of whether religious organizations
should be held to the same standards of accountability as other
Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (application of FCC rules to religious
organization).
120. One might also note the decision in Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks
Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Mass. 1990), which, although involving a landmark ordinance, directly affected the method of worship because the ordinance
applied to the internal arrangement of furniture within the church.
121. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 US. 896 (1972); EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982);
Assemany v. Archdiocese of Detroit, 434 N.W.2d 233 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Alicea
v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 608 k 2 d 218 (N.J. 1992); Scharon v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991); Rayburn
v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-71 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of
United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 1994 U.S.
LEXIS 7124 (1994).
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types of charitable, not-for-profit organizations. While they
clearly should not and cannot be subjected to more regulations,
are there circumstances, particularly those which involve compelling or significant government interests, such as protection
of children and eradication of employment discrimination, in
which religious organizations should be held to the same standard as other charitable and not-for-profit organizations. Such
a standard of accountability based on equality norms should, in
turn, be tempered by considerations of whether the burden of
government regulation falls primarily on individuals or on
institutions. Thus, in evaluating the burdens imposed on religious organizations as part of a free exercise analysis, a different standard or level of scrutiny should be utilized depending
on whether the burdens seem to fall more on the institutional
than on the individual aspects of religious free exercise.

